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I very much welcome the opportunity to comment on Gavin Lucas’s 
keynote discussion, for it raises a number of interesting and timely is-
sues. It is as a result of disciplinary insecurities as well as of particular 
ways of categorising academic practice that archaeologists continue to 
debate the pitfalls of “borrowing” theories from other disciplines. But 
to what extent should we see these as borrowed rather than shared? 
Although writers such as Hägerstrand or Wallerstein may have been 
more firmly embedded in other disciplines in their lifetimes (or have 
been claimed more vociferously by those fields after their deaths), their 
theories derive as much from ways of understanding the world com-
mon within their broader cultural contexts (the zeitgeist, as it were) as 
from unique disciplinary histories. Theories, whatever their discipli-
nary origin, derive their “popularity” from their fit with or ability to 
respond to the acute social and political concerns of the day. This is 
the case both for “lower order” travelling concepts such as agency and 
for “higher order” theories such as evolutionism. For this reason, Lu-
cas is quite right to pick apart the perceived distinction between theory 
building and theory borrow ing. The logico-deductive framework in 
which the pursuit of theory building took place in processual archae-
ology saw the process as neutral and objective: theories were viewed 
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as value-free – scientific principles to be tested. But if we accept that 
theoretical frameworks are inevitably the product of particular social 
and political conditions, then “building” theory is neither better than 
nor different to “borrowing” it.
This, of course, requires us to question the difference between “top-
down” and “bottom-up” theory. The distinction between these is some-
thing that Lucas explores in detail and, like him, I can see both bene-
fits and problems with retaining this distinction. On the one hand, it is 
tempting to eschew the universalizing and autocratic claims of top-down 
approaches and to take a perspective that promises not just to demo-
cratize theory but to respond to the specificities of archaeological data 
– answering archaeological questions “at the trowel’s edge”, as Hodder 
(1999:92) puts it. On the other hand, it is surely the case that, whether 
sitting in a library or digging in a trench, our understanding of how the 
world works – from soil colour to social relationships – is a product of 
our own cultural traditions and contemporary politics. The idea that 
top-down theory is disconnected from the “realities” of lived experi-
ence and that a bottom-up approach allows a more authentic engage-
ment with the past seems reasonable in some ways, but is in other ways 
problematic. Perspectives that argue that we should use the empirical 
evidence to develop new theories implicitly assume that our aim as ar-
chaeologists is to uncover the past, when it seems to me that the whole 
point of the discipline is to provide us with ways of thinking through 
troublesome issues in the present – whether those are climatic change, 
temporality, or gendered identity. In this sense, then, as Lucas points 
out, all archaeologists “do” theory, regardless of the character of their 
professional practice. The idea that the data itself should lead the way is 
appealing, but it is surely the case that we would not excavate, analyse 
or perhaps even recognize that data unless it in some way highlighted 
contemporary cultural needs: theory cannot magically emerge from the 
data nor, as Lucas rightly argues, should it be separated from practice. 
Even those identified as theoreticians base their theories on lived expe-
rience and – albeit often implicitly – are always working with particu-
lar datasets in mind. As such, the distinction between top-down and 
bottom-up theory is, I think, ultimately unhelpful, for both fulfil the 
same social function.
These points remind us that the creation of boundaries between aca-
demic disciplines is equally a matter of politics and can be linked to 
contemporary Western ways of categorizing the world (particularly 
dualisms such as nature–culture, or animate–inanimate). Of course, 
fields such as archaeology, anthropology, biology and geology can all 
be viewed as products of the colonialist and nationalist agendas of the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – the assumption that any one of 
these is more “objective” than another is problematic. As such, although 
theoreticians may be claimed by particular disciplines, the bounda-
ries of those subjects are open to deconstruction. Certainly, it is widely 
recog nized that the conceptual categories underpinning the systems of 
value that differentiate academic fields such as history and archae ology 
(theory–practice; mind–body) are a product of post-Enlightenment ra-
tionalism, yet that has not boosted our own confidence in the disci-
pline. Unfortunately, although Lucas suggests that borrowing scientific 
methodo logies is usually considered less problematic than borrowing 
theories, that is not always the case: archaeologists (even those who work 
with ancient DNA or isotopes) are rarely seen as “real” scientists, but 
as practitioners of applied science who do not themselves develop new 
scientific theories or methods. Here, too, disciplinary hierarchies are at 
work. Yet, as Lucas discusses, the frequency with which “archaeology” 
or “excavation” are employed as concept metaphors in other disciplines 
speaks of their cultural potency. Although archaeology is often “re-
duced” to its methodologies (notably by the media), those methodolo-
gies themselves are powerful conceptual tools; this is hardly a surprise 
for, as Lucas points out, practices such as excavation, stratigraphic re-
cording and landscape survey not only reflect the peculiar obsessions of 
modernity (such as linear concepts of time), but help to constitute that 
modern world, for example by normalizing the technologies of tempo-
ral and spatial measurement that underpin capitalism and colonialism. 
Our methodologies are therefore inescapably theoretical for they are 
built on particular ways of understanding the world.
This point allows us to return to questions regarding the character 
and purpose of archaeology. I agree with Lucas that re-valuing the prac-
tice of archaeology – the embodied engagement with pit edge or sherd 
that allows archaeologists to work through their place in the world – is 
crucial. Indeed, it is surely this that is the proper subject of archaeol-
ogy: the fluid interface, the push and pull, between people and things 
both in the past and the present. Exploring those boundaries by work-
ing with – and sometimes against – the materiality of the archaeological 
record constitutes archaeologists’ particular contribution, and it is one 
we should not be ashamed of, for it allows us to address concerns shared 
by other disciplines, from the impact of environmental degradation to 
changing concepts of personhood. Just as archaeology is an amalgam 
of approaches and perspectives drawn both from other fields of enquiry 
and from our wider cultural context (a point that can indeed be made 
for any academic discipline), so too this gives us an opportunity to com-
ment on and contribute to debates that might not traditionally be viewed 
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as “archaeological”. Importantly, this means that archae ology can be 
both a particularizing and a generalizing subject, for just as we make 
broad assumptions about the properties of things, or the processes by 
which people and objects together create social networks, so too archae-
ological studies of the different ways in which those properties and re-
lationships have been articulated in particular historical contexts help 
us understand the diversity of human experience.
Of course, if we contest the problematic split between theory and 
practice, there is less reason to be alarmed by the oft-perceived lack of 
theoretical innovation since the development of post-processual archae-
ology. As Lucas points out, the search for the “next big thing” in archae-
ological theory is driven by the modern Western obsession with “big 
men”, grand narratives, innovation and competition. Contemporary 
archae ology’s postmodern acceptance of a plurality of overlapping posi-
tions that cannot easily be equated with particular “isms” is often seen 
in negative terms but it is not clear to me that it should be. Origin myths 
evoking unilinear evolution and paradigm shifts are necessary only if 
we conceptualize archaeology as a discipline that can (or should) “ad-
vance” or “improve” over time, for example by providing increasingly 
accurate reconstructions of a “true” past; the assumption that this is the 
core purpose of archaeology has of course long been questioned. Just 
as disciplinary boundaries are often unhelpful (and may be as much to 
do with academic identity politics as with susbstantive differences in 
method, theory or subject matter), so the partisan promotion of theo-
retical divides within archaeology may ultimately be less constructive 
than collaboration and diversity of approach. For this reason, too, we 
must get over our love-hate relationship with archaeological theory. The 
anta gonism towards theory still evident in many circles is not warranted, 
for every time we clean a section or examine a fragment of bone, we 
are engaging with ideas about how the world works and what human 
life means – albeit at a variety of temporal and spatial scales. As Lucas 
so eloquently argues, we must have confidence in ourselves, in our dis-
cipline, and in our ability to make a productive contribution to those 
broader “theoretical” debates.
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